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This chapter explores the transformation of autobiographical memory in 
life transitions. To do so, it proposes a model of autobiographical memory 
as an oriented sociocultural act, whereby the person imaginatively 
distances herself from past experiences to produce a meaningful 
discourse on her past. This model is applied to the development of 
autobiographical memory during adolescence, a crucial period in this 
regard, and is used to analyze a series of longitudinal documentaries on 
teenagers in Switzerland. Based on two case studies, it is argued that 
adolescents learn to make sense of their past by building on previous 
recalls of their experiences, successively reworking their interpretation of 
what happened. As they discover new concepts, interlocutors, and 
cultural tools, they learn to distance themselves from their experiences to 
produce stories that are meaningful for their present selves, which they 
can share with others, and that can be turned into lessons to be learned. 
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Introduction 
Why do we attach so much importance to the memories of our own life—
enough to keep them in diaries and books, share them with others 
through anecdotes and pictures, or worry that, in time, we might forget 
them? In this chapter, we explore how such memories help us overcome 
changes, transitions, and challenges in life by allowing us to make sense 
of what has happened and to imagine what could come next. To do so, 
we adopt a pragmatic stance that highlights three main functions of 
autobiographical memory: its role in the construction of the self, in 
relating with others, and in directing our actions toward the future. By 
connecting the last, directive function to scholarship on imagination, we 
propose a dynamic and pragmatic model of autobiographical 
remembering as a sociocultural act unfolding in time. This model allows 
us to retrace the development of autobiographical memory over the life-
course and follow the transformation of its uses. Finally, we apply this 
1Published in B. Wagoner (Ed.), Handbook of memory and culture, pp. 1-32, 2016, 
which should be used for any reference to this work
Memory in Life Transitions 
Constance de Saint Laurent 
Tania Zittoun 
University of Neuchâtel 
Abstract 
model to the longitudinal case study of a teenager and discuss its 
implications for further research. 
Autobiographical Memory 
There are probably as many ways to define autobiographical memory as 
there are researchers working on the topic. We adopt the view that it is 
made up of the “personal memories of the events of our lives” (Nelson, 
2007, p. 184) and that it is distributed along four main dimensions, 
which we describe next. 
First, and quite unsurprisingly, autobiographical memory concerns what 
one remembers about one’s own past. The main point here is not so 
much that it is about what happened to oneself in the past but that it is 
remembered as such—that is, a memory of an event affecting the self. 
This specific quality of autobiographical memory is called autoneotic 
consciousness (Tulving, 2002). This means that, for instance, 
remembering that the word for “butterfly” in Spanish is “mariposa” is not 
quite the same as remembering that one learned it from a story told by 
one’s mother about a failed Spanish exam—although both actually refer 
to the same event in one’s life. The first formulation is just a memory of a 
fact; the second one refers to a personal life event—that is, one’s personal 
experience of being told a story by one’s mother. 
Second, autobiographical memory is more than the mere accumulation 
of past life events; it involves at least a partial semiotic, semantic, or 
narrative integration. The degree of this integration varies, leading to 
more or less general memories—from the episodic memories of single 
events to a personal memory encompassing general principles about self, 
values, and beliefs. Multiple episodes of one’s life can be brought 
together by giving them similar meanings (Habermas & Bluck, 2000), 
organizing them along a coherent timeline (Bluck & Alea, 2008), relating 
them to the stories of others (Fivush, Bohanek, & Duke, 2008), or 
making them fit into cultural autobiographical narratives (Berntsen & 
Rubin, 2002). 
Third, these integrations are supported by a rather wide array of cultural 
tools—narrative structures, conventional ways of telling one’s life, lay 
normative models of development, and so on, up to language—shaping 
the way we talk about our past, link it to the present, and make sense of 
it (Fivush, 2011), to the point that, as McAdams (2001), states, 
stories live in culture. . . . [Indeed, they] are born, they 
grow, they proliferate, and they eventually die according to 
the norms, rules, and traditions that prevail in a given 
society, according to a society’s implicit understandings of 
what counts as a tellable story, a tellable life. (p. 114) 
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Fourth, remembering one’s past is a social activity, often done together 
with others and thus involving multiple perspectives (Nelson, 2008). 
Indeed, social interactions are necessary for the development of memory: 
It is through their conversations with adults that children learn to 
remember the past and organize it in narratives that can be 
communicated to others (Nelson, 2007; see also Nelson, Chapter 8, this 
volume). Moreover, reminiscence is a cultural activity (Fivush, 2011); not 
only do our social environments shape the way we talk about our past 
but also they are often an important source of autobiographical 
demands. This may be especially true in Western societies, in which 
performing an autobiographical narrative is required from children quite 
early on (through activities such as retelling one’s weekend, etc.). These 
specific demands may be linked to certain representations of the 
“healthy” self as an independent and coherent whole (Nelson, 2008). 
Taking these four aspects into consideration, a more thorough definition 
of autobiographical memory thus considers it as “that uniquely human 
form of memory that moves beyond recall of experienced events to 
integrate perspectives, interpretation, and evaluation across self, other, 
and time to create a personal history” (Fivush, 2011, p. 560). This 
implies that autobiographical memory changes throughout the life: It 
depends on the experiences a person had, the ability she has to reflect 
upon them, the cultural tools she masters, and her interactions with 
others. This development has rarely been studied beyond childhood. In 
this chapter, we examine the development of memory in the life course, 
focusing on the moments of catalyzed change that we call transitions 
(Kadianaki & Zittoun, 2014). To do so, we propose taking a pragmatic 
stance on memory. 
A Pragmatic Stance on Memory 
Pragmatism invites us to move away from abstract considerations about 
the true value of a notion or the a priori examination of its value to 
concentrate on what can be done with it. From a pragmatist stance, a 
notion is useful or good enough if it allows one to see the world in a more 
intelligible way, to explain a phenomenon otherwise not understood, or to 
act upon it. Pragmatism also invites us to examine what people do with 
the entity designated by the notion discussed (James, 1904). In our case, 
it implies to focus not only on what autobiographical memory is but also 
mainly what it is used for (Pillemer & Kuwabara, 2012). 
Life stories are not told in a vacuum: They are part of conversations with 
others and often with the self; have a developmental history; and take 
place in specific social, historical, and cultural contexts. Then, what do 
we do when we talk about our past in these contexts? Why do we tell 
stories about ourselves? What does a personal history bring that other 
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forms of memory would not provide already? To answer these questions, 
Susan Bluck has proposed dividing the functions of autobiographical 
memory into three main categories: self, social, and directive (Bluck, 
2003; Bluck, Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005). Following these three 
functions, we explore what is known about the development of memory. 
Autobiographical Memory and the Self 
First, and quite unsurprisingly, we use autobiographical memory to 
define who we are (Fivush, 2011). Life is full of ruptures and changes, 
and we also tend to assume different roles and positions depending on 
the sphere of experience we are in. By sphere of experience, we mean the 
following (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2015a): 
A configuration of experiences, activities, representations 
and feelings, recurrently occurring in a given type of social 
(material and symbolic) setting—it is one of the various 
regular, stabilized patterns of experience in which a 
person is likely to engage on a regular basis. (p. 8) 
Even if the me-at-home and the me-at-work are not similar, both are part 
of who I experience I am. Thus, each “self” is a set of multiple identities 
or “identity positions,” interacting with each other and evolving in time—
a sort of “society of minds” (Hermans, 2002). But if it is so, how do we 
achieve a coherent sense of who we are? Through organizing past events 
into a narrative, we establish a sense of continuity (Erikson, 1959). By 
causally and temporally linking different parts of our lives (Fitzgerald & 
Broadbridge, 2012), we develop “narrative identities,” which are “stories 
people construct and tell about themselves to define who they are” 
(McAdams, Josselson, & Liebich, 2006, p. 4). 
This ability to connect past and present selves has a long developmental 
history, from infancy to early adulthood. Indeed, although children are 
able to produce personal stories that are chronologically organized from 
approximately the age of 8, it is not until they are 10 years old that they 
can integrate several proximal events into a single narrative (Habermas, 
2012). More global coherence, causally and thematically linking multiple 
personal events, does not appear until the age of 12 (Habermas & de 
Silveira, 2008). It seems, however, that people start to tell full life stories 
only during adolescence, when the necessary and previously mentioned 
cognitive skills are fully developed and when it becomes an “age-specific 
requirement” to define one’s identity (Habermas & Bluck, 2000, p. 753). 
Indeed, it is expected from teenagers to develop a stable identity 
(Erikson, 1968), and in Western societies, in which being a “unique 
being” is particularly valued (Nelson, 2008), personal narratives are an 
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especially efficient way to achieve such an aim (Habermas & Bluck, 
2000). 
Life stories also require the mastery of various norms and expectations 
that surround the narration of one’s life (Bruner, 2003)—what Habermas 
(2007) termed mastery of “the cultural concept of biography” (p. 1). These 
cultural norms can also be represented in the form of life-scripts or 
“culturally shared representations of the timing of major transitional life 
events” (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004, p. 427). In any case, the idea is that to 
tell one’s life “is a form of cultural activity and as such is individually and 
culturally specific to the local and cultural forms of social interaction 
from which it is shaped” (Fivush, 2011, p. 561). Although children start 
to use culture-specific story forms to tell personal events starting at 
approximately 5–7 years of age, using frames borrowed from myths and 
tales to structure their stories (Nelson, 2003), it is not until adolescence 
that individuals fully master normative life-scripts. Research has shown 
that a peak is attained at approximately 16 years old, followed by a 
decrease until the age of 20 and remaining quite stable for the rest of the 
life course, probably because “adults [convey] a more realistic variation 
in the life course than adolescents [do], whose depiction [is] highly 
stereotyped” (Habermas, 2007, p. 4). However, the mastery of these 
normative cornerstones is necessary to be able to tell a life story: Even if 
one’s path always deviates from what is expected to happen in life, they 
help us choose which elements to include—especially those that are 
culturally considered as relevant—and which ones deserve explanation—
typically those that differ from the norm (Schütze, 1984, as cited in 
Habermas & Bluck, 2000, p. 750). 
In addition, memories change together with the ideas one has about the 
self (Habermas, 2012) and are constantly reinterpreted from the 
perspective of the present. Thus, the relation between autobiographical 
memory and self is bidirectional (Conway, 2005), and as Cameron, 
Wilson, and Ross (2004) expressed it, “People fashion identities that fit 
their memories and memories that fit their identities” (p. 208). Periods of 
transitions and changes lead to more conscious efforts to reconstruct a 
meaningful and coherent narrative (Bluck & Alea, 2008). Moreover, 
periods during which important aspects of one’s identity are defined tend 
to be remembered more, or at least made more salient (Fitzgerald & 
Broadbridge, 2012): If we remember more events that occur during the 
10- to 30-year-old age period than during any other—the “reminiscence 
bump” (Rubin, Wetzler, & Nebes, 1986)—it is because these events play 
the major role in our identity (Rathbone, Moulin, & Conway, 2008).
Finally, having a personal story implies being able to make a distinction 
between one’s own past and the memories of others (Fivush, 2011), and 
thus between self and other (Nelson, 2008). It also involves being able to 
recognize memory as perspectival—what I remember about an event may 
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not be what you remember about it—which children are not able to do 
until the end of the preschool years (Fivush et al., 2008). By taking part 
in reminiscing conversations with adults whose perspectives on the past 
may diverge, children move away from a memory perceived as a copy of 
what happened to understanding their memories as their own subjective 
version of the past (Nelson, 2008). 
What happens to the development of autobiographical memory beyond 
childhood? If one function of autobiographical memory is to establish a 
sense of who we are, then any events that are likely to question who we 
are, or change our definition of ourselves, can also demand some new 
elaboration of autobiographical memories. From a lifecourse perspective, 
it is typically moments of crises, bifurcations, or transitions that 
question our sense of integrity and self-continuity and usually call upon 
our memories (Erikson, 1959; Sato, Yasuda, Kanzaki, & Valsiner, 2013; 
Zittoun et al., 2013). Adolescence, becoming a parent, moving to a 
different country, and changing job or partner usually question who we 
are, for oneself and for others. The notion of transition designates the 
processes of readjustment in which a person engages when or after she 
perceives a rupture; these usually involve identity transformations, 
learning (acquiring new skills, knowledge, or ways of doing), and sense-
making (Zittoun, 2006). As discussed later, transitions are quite likely to 
engage memory work, precisely because of the various functions of 
memory. 
Autobiographical Memory and Interactions 
The second function autobiographical memory serves is relational. By 
conversing about the past, people create converging accounts of what 
happened, thus developing a shared representation of the past that 
facilitates collective action (Hirst, Cuc, & Wohl, 2012). However, life 
stories also have the potential to locate us in time and in the social world 
by connecting our lives with those of others (Fivush et al., 2008): 
Developing a narrative about one’s childhood, for instance, also locates 
one relative to siblings, parents, and so on. Moreover, because much of 
autobiographical memory is actually memory of past relations 
(Habermas, 2012), it “provide[s] a framework for interpreting current 
relationships” (Fivush, 2011, p. 575) and “serve[s] to create and maintain 
social and emotional bonds with others through reminiscing and through 
representations of relationships” (p. 574). Other people’s narratives also 
participate in this function, especially those of family members, which 
have the potential to create a sense of connection and cohesion with the 
rest of the family (Fivush et al., 2008). 
The links between social relations and autobiographical memory are not 
limited to the latter sustaining the former: Accounts of the past are also 
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forged through social interactions. Indeed, remembering is a social 
activity, and what we recall and forget depends on with whom we are 
remembering (Halbwachs, 1950). Elements that are made salient by 
others will be more easily recalled, whereas what others silence will 
eventually be forgotten (Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012). Moreover, the stories 
we tell are forged through past reminiscing episodes. Very rehearsed 
narratives, for instance, can become surprisingly stable through the 
years, as in the case of flashbulb memories (Baddeley, 2012), whereas 
stories of difficult events may be transformed each time they are told 
until a form of closure is found (Habermas, 2012). In any case, “acts of 
recall must be viewed as having a social history” and are created in 
conversation with others (Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012, p. 63). 
Social interactions also play a central role in the development of 
autobiographical memory. As discussed in the previous section, it is 
through social interactions that children realize the perspectival nature 
of memories (Nelson, 2008). In addition, during conversations about the 
past, parents scaffold children’s accounts “by specifically supporting 
those aspects of life narratives which children and adolescents are about 
to acquire next” (Habermas, Negele, & Mayer, 2010, p. 348). They also 
“convey that there are certain ways to tell these kinds of stories, focusing 
not just on what happened but why it was interesting, important, and 
emotional” (Fivush, Habermas, Waters, & Zaman, 2011, p. 324). Through 
this, children acquire biographical concepts to the point that they master 
the life stories of others before they can build their own (Habermas & 
Bluck, 2000). Thus, “the ways in which parents, and especially mothers, 
structure conversations about past events with their preschool children 
have strong and enduring influences on how children come to construct 
their own narrative life history” (Nelson & Fivush, 2004, p. 497). 
Moreover, different cultural and historical contexts will also give more or 
less importance to reminiscing and will shape what is expected in an 
autobiographical account (Habermas, 2011). School activities such as 
telling what one did for the holidays, a tradition favored in Western 
societies, teach children not only how to tell a story but also that they 
are expected to do so (Nelson, 2008). 
Again, it is quite likely that as people move through life, the meeting of 
new others will also convoke autobiographical memories: To fulfill their 
relational function, memories are quite likely to be revisited every time 
people establish new significant relationships—friends, partners, and 
children. These might typically occur during transitions but not only 
during these times. Many social situations, which can be connected to 
transitions, require the elaboration of an autobiographical account: a job 
postulation, creating a blog, a family celebration, and so on. 
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Autobiographical Memory and Imagination 
The third function of autobiographical memory is directive. By this, we 
mean that it has the potential to direct actions. The notion of “directive 
function” has been used to designate its role in guiding, planning, or 
motivating future actions on the basis of the past (Pillemer, 2003). This 
directive function has variations. 
First, it allows us to act in the present based on what we learned from 
past experiences. Singer and Blagov (2004), for instance, showed that 
“self-defining memories”—vivid and emotional memories that are 
repeatedly recalled—are able to guide action in the present based on past 
experiences, which is why people remember them so often. When faced 
with decisions about their lives or difficulties to overcome, people can use 
memories of past similar events to choose a path of action. 
Second, by organizing the past into a narrative and linking it to the 
present (Fivush, 2011), autobiographical memory also gives a direction to 
one’s life (Habermas, 2012). Indeed, if narratives follow culturally shared 
story lines, it also means that we come to expect, or anticipate, what 
comes next and how things should end (e.g., think of the much 
anticipated endings of many Hollywood movies). Some authors have thus 
called this “prospective memory,” the process of “remembering to perform 
an action at a future point in time in the absence of an external 
prompt” (Mattli, Schnitzspahn, Studerus-Germann, Brehmer, & Zöllig, 
2014), and have studied it in the workplace (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). 
Third, autobiographical memory allows us to imagine possible futures. 
Similarly, imagination allows us to explore what could or might be and, 
on this basis, enables us to choose a path toward what we view as 
desirable (Zittoun & de Saint-Laurent, 2015). Memory not only provides 
the “material” from which the future can be imagined (Vygotsky, 2004) 
but also, by giving us a sense of who we are, gives us a sense of what we 
could be and what we may want to be. Such observations have led many 
researchers to argue that autobiographical memory is primarily oriented 
toward the future (Fivush, 2011) and that its directive function is the 
most important one (Dudai & Carruthers, 2005; Schacter & Addis, 
2007). We could indeed argue that memory feeds forward into the future; 
it is what has been called a “proleptic” function (Cole, 2007; Valsiner, 
2014). 
However, research rarely explores the directive function of memory, and 
when asked why they remember, people refer to the self and social 
functions much more often than they refer to the future (Bluck et al., 
2005); however, the self-report method might be responsible for these 
results (Pillemer, 2003). Although the importance of the directive 
function is still to be explored, there is compelling evidence that 
autobiographical memory and imagining the future are deeply linked. 
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Indeed, the underlying neurological processes seem be the same 
(Berntsen & Bohn, 2010) or at least to rest on similar abilities (Mullally & 
Maguire, 2014); memory deficits and losses are usually accompanied by 
difficulties in imagining future situations and in telling fictitious stories 
(D’Argembeau, 2012). Moreover, these two functions develop during the 
same period (D’Argembeau, 2012), and children acquire a sense of past 
and future at the same time, during the preschool years (Nelson, 2008). 
Finally, both remembering the past and imagining the future rely on 
cultural scripts that help one move away from the present (Berntsen & 
Bohn, 2010). For instance, the amount of details given is identical for 
periods that are similarly distant from the present, whether they are 
located in the future or in the past (D’Argembeau, 2012). 
The directive function of memory is likely to be triggered in transitions. 
In many cases, it is when the taken for granted is questioned that new 
options have to be imagined; these explorations of possibility rely on re-
examining one’s past in light of the future, and defining possible futures 
in light of one’s past, through the present (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2015b). 
Similar to the previous two functions, the directive function can be 
normatively triggered; again, career choices or job interviews typically 
demand people to be able to show how their past experiences led them to 
a clear future path. 
What may be lacking, then, is a model that fully integrates remembering 
and imagining. Although some proposals have been presented, such as 
Tulving’s (2002) idea of mental time travel, few attempts have been made 
to link scholarship on memory and on imagination (for some notable 
exceptions, see Bartlett (1995) or Mullally & Maguire (2014)). This lack of 
articulation may be due to the fact that most memory research is 
considered to be about the reality of the past, whereas most studies of 
imagination consider it as focused on the non-real. However, the 
directive function of memory encourages us to further examine the link 
between these two processes. 
Imagination is the process of distancing from the here and now of 
experience, a move that draws on past experiences and a diversity of 
resources while allowing us to explore alternative and future possibilities, 
which in turn transform the present and may guide immediate action 
(Vygotsky, 1931/1994, 2004; Zittoun & Gillespie, 2015a). Previously, we 
proposed to represent this process as a loop of consciousness. These 
loops can vary in a three-dimensional space according to their temporal 
orientation (i.e., they are about past or future events), their generality 
(i.e., they concern a specific event, such as fixing a bookshelf, or general 
matters, such as making the world a better place), and their 
(im)plausibility (e.g., in a northern European town in 2014, imagining 
that one could receive a fine for parking one’s automobile poorly, which 
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along a line of other instances of remembering or imagining (t0, t1, and 
t2 in Figure 9.2)—hence the triangular-shaped “Toblerone”-like model 
(see also Bauer & Gaskell, 1999). 
This integrative model thus proposes to contribute to the literature on 
autobiographical memory. First, it postulates that it is the triangular 
relation between self, other, and tools that opens the symbolic space 
necessary for autobiographical memory (see also Nelson, Chapter 8, this 
volume). On the one hand, social and cultural tools are what make the 
(re)organization of past events, beyond the chronological retelling of 
single episodes, possible in the first place. On the other hand, it is 
through the interaction with the perspective of others that we can both 
understand our memories as being subjective and specific to ourselves – 
Tulving’s autoneotic consciousness – and distance ourselves from them 
to construct alternative interpretations. Second, autobiographical 
memories must be understood as the product of a double history: the 
history of the past recalls of the specific event(s) remembered and one’s 
history of remembering in general, as it participates in the construction 
of the “pool” of resources one can use to remember. Third, the central 
role of imagining is highlighted as an active process of construction 
partaking in remembering and its inherent future orientation. Fourth, 
autobiographical memory is part of a larger ongoing action, and the 
functions memory may serve are constrained by the resources and 
interlocutors available, as well as one’s history of recall. 
This conceptualization allows understanding why memories are so 
sensitive to cultural norms, media, and other people’s discourses. In 
effect, telling one’s story is a process of narrative imagination, which 
demands selection and creation and which is fed by “‘second-hand’ 
resources as books, movies, and other media—that are at once highly 
influential in shaping the process of autobiographical understanding but 
of which one may remain largely unaware” (Freeman, 2007, p. 139). 
Issues about children testimony (Jensen, 2005; Takagi & Mori, Chapter 
6, this volume) or the reliability of past events in oral history (e.g., former 
Wehrmacht soldiers tend to use images and events from recent films 
when they tell their past war experiences; Welzer, Moller, & Tschuggnall, 
2002/2013) can thus be explained by the fact that remembering is 
closely linked to imagining, being always a creation that combines both 
personal experiences and the resources at hand. In this way, the 
imaginative processes of memory can lead to practices that can actually 
change social relations and situations. 
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The Development of Autobiographical Memory in the Life 
Course 
As the functional approach has shown, there is much at stake in the 
development of autobiographical memory. First, it is by developing a 
narrative explaining who they have been through time that people 
acquire a coherent sense of self. Second, through reminiscing together, 
people redefine and reinforce social relationships. Third, by integrating 
multiple life events into a single narrative, people can give direction to 
their lives and imagine what may come next. But how do these functions 
develop during the life course? 
Adolescence and Memory 
As discussed previously, little is known about the emergence of these 
functions (Fivush, 2011). Memory researchers do consider the self “as a 
continuous individual person with a past and a future [which] emerges 
during the early childhood period” (Nelson, 2008, p. 13). Then, most 
existing models draw on Erikson’s intuition that the ability to tell one’s 
life story appears during adolescence (Erikson, 1968) and consider that 
these functions develop during this period (McAdams, 2001; Reese, Yan, 
Jack, & Hayne, 2010). Adolescence—classically, the period that follows 
biological puberty—is thus considered one of the most important periods 
to understand the development of memory, and the development of 
autobiography can be linked to a more general developmental process. 
There seems to be a consensus that it is during adolescence that people 
are faced with the tremendous task of developing a stable identity, a 
purpose that is best served by reaching a global and coherent life 
narrative (Bluck & Habermas, 2000). Indeed, memories of adolescence 
tend to become central to one’s story once an adult and also to be linked 
to important aspects of the self (Rathbone et al., 2008). That “task” of 
defining a stable identity is set both by psychological needs and by 
relational and social expectations. 
Adolescence appears to be the period during which many of the cognitive 
abilities necessary for autobiographical memory are developed (Fivush et 
al., 2011). In a review of the existing literature on the development of 
autobiographical memory in adolescence, Habermas and Bluck (2000) 
regrouped the abilities necessary to attain global narrative coherence in a 
life story into four main categories. The first one is temporal sequencing, 
or the organization of stories around timelines, which does not fully 
develop until late childhood (Friedman, 1992). The second one is mastery 
of the cultural concept of biography—that is, the local understanding of 
how a life story should be organized. As noted previously, it is not until 
mid-adolescence that people fully master these life-scripts (Habermas, 
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2007), and it is not until late adolescence to early adulthood that they 
can use these in a flexible and realistic manner (Habermas & de Silveira, 
2008). The third one is causal coherence, which links multiple events 
and emotional states with one another. Although children can achieve 
local coherence from late childhood, only by mid-adolescence do 
teenagers begin to make connections between long periods of time and to 
explain their life in terms of personality and developmental trajectory. 
Also, it is not until late adolescence that they begin to explain change 
and people’s behaviors in terms of past experiences (Feldman, Bruner, 
Kalmar, & Renderer, 1993). The fourth one is thematic coherence, which 
establishes a global coherence between several episodes of one’s life 
through tools such as metaphors or cultural maxims. This ability 
develops slowly during adolescence through the capacity to summarize 
stories, interpret them, and question existing interpretations and 
knowledge (Bluck & Habermas, 2000). 
Adolescence is the period during which young people progressively 
become independent from their parents and families (Grotevant & 
Cooper, 1986; Hofer, 2004; Steinberg & Silverberg, 1986) and the 
importance of horizontal relationships—those with friends, intimates, 
and partners—increases (Collins, Gleason, & Sesma, 1997; Laursen & 
Collins, 2011; Meeus, Branje, van der Valk, & de Wied, 2007). As a 
consequence, the role of parents in supporting consistency and 
information in the construction of memories (Habermas, 2012; Fivush et 
al., 2008) may progressively diminish, especially with regard to recent 
memories. Socializing outside the home, young people create new 
memories and new groups with which they can remember. Adolescents 
may thus develop new understandings of their past, which may foster 
what has been called “autobiographical reasoning.” This is the “process 
of self-reflective thinking or talking about the personal past that involves 
forming links between elements of one’s life and the self in an attempt to 
relate one’s personal past and present,” the basis of life narratives (Bluck 
& Habermas, 2000, p. 749). 
Finally, the need for identity definition is set socially as people enter the 
life period during which they define studies, career paths, or life 
trajectories—a period whose ending has been largely debated (Arnett, 
2006; Hendry & Kloep, 2007; Zittoun, 2007). This raises the important 
need to understand autobiographical memory in adolescence within a 
broader lifecourse perspective. 
A Case Study 
Despite its richness for the topic of autobiographical memory, 
adolescence has rarely been explored by researchers interested in this 
topic. We previously investigated the development and transformation of 
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imaginative processes during adolescence (Zittoun & de Saint-Laurent, 
2015) using the longitudinal documentary Romans d’ados (Teens Novels) 
(Bakhti, 2010).1 This documentary follows the parallel evolution of seven 
young people (four young women and three young men, all middle class), 
who live in a midsize French-speaking town in Switzerland, from their 
11th to their 18th birthday. They are visited regularly by the 
documentary crew at their homes, at school, at the workplace, or when 
they are with their friends. Although the documentary is scripted and 
edited according to the interests of the director, it gives good access to 
the evolution of these young people’s close relationships, vocational 
choices, and general orientations. 
The focus of this initial exploration was on the imaginative loops in which 
adolescents engage (see Figure 9.1) and their contribution to developing a 
life trajectory (Zittoun & de Saint-Laurent, 2015). In doing so, however, 
the teenagers also drew on the past, showing how memory feeds into 
imaginative processes. This can be seen, for instance, in the case of 
Rachel, aged 15, who reflects on her active role in supporting her mother 
at a time of major crises between her mother and her stepfather (Figure 
9.3). Discovering one day her desperate mother left alone by her 
companion after a violent quarrel, Rachel engaged in the following 
reflection (Bakhti, 2010; as quoted in Zittoun & de Saint-Laurent, 2015, 
p. 68):
I thought about it. [I went into my room, I thought about 
it]. [I told myself that I would] take the matter into my 
hands. I didn’t want my family to break up like this. I 
wanted to help my mother and my sister the best I could. 
(Rachel, 15, DVD 2) 
Rachel also tells that this episode put at stake her own future: Because 
her father left the house when she was 2 years old, “I felt as if I was 
losing my second father. In case of another divorce, I thought I could 
never trust a man again. And that my relationships with men were going 
to be very complicated” (Rachel, 15, DVD 2) (Bakhti, 2010; as quoted in 
Zittoun & de Saint-Laurent, 2015, p. 68). Finally, she explains how, 
during that time, she was drawing on the memory of her grandfather 
Bakhti, 2010; as quoted in Zittoun & de Saint-Laurent, 2015, p. 67): 
I’ve always been very proud of my grandfather. I had a very special 
relationship with him even when I was little. I really have the impression 
that he taught us many things, and that it is thanks to him that I am as 
1 Longitudinal documentaries, as specific genre following people over a longer period of 
time (Kilborn, 2010), offer an interesting source of data for developmental research—a 
strategy that we have used and justified elsewhere (Gillespie & Zittoun, 2010; Zittoun & 
de Saint-Laurent, 2015; Zittoun & Gillespie, 2012). 
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turn to a new case study, that of Thys, another young person followed for 
7 years by Bakhti (2010). 
Thys’ story starts when he is 12 years old, living with his mother and 
older brother. He is not very talkative, and most of his life seems to 
revolve around “being an old couple” with his mother, something she 
jokes about, and visiting his father on weekends, who teases him 
frequently. In the following conversation, his mother asks him what he 
did with his father over the weekend (Bakhti, 2010, DVD 1): 
Mother: How are you doing, Thyssou? The weekend 
went well? 
Thys: Yes. 
Mother: What did you do? 
Thys: Well, we came Friday . . . 
Mother: Yes. 
Thys: We watched TV for a bit . . . 
Mother: Yes. 
Thys: And after, well Saturday we went . . . well, in 
the morning we went to Jean-Claude’s . . . 
Mother: Saturday morning you went out? Ah, good, 
well, ok. 
Thys: Yes. Well . . . after we did lunch there . . . well, 
after we went to see the show . . . 
Mother: So you had lunch and dinner at Jean-Claude’s? 
The Auntie was there? 
Thys: No, she was not there. 
Mother: Ah, it was only the two of you? 
Thys: Yes! Us, us three. 
Mother: Ok. 
Thys: There was also Christiane. 
Mother: Ah, she came? 
Thys: Yeah. 
This conversation seems quite typical of late childhood reminiscing: The 
mother scaffolds her child’s recall, which becomes organized into a small 
local narrative, as illustrated in Figure 9.4. Thys, in a conversation with 
his mother, reconstructs what happened, with the mother supporting 
this process (Fivush, 2011). His mother’s questions as well as basic 
chronological rules—starting the story with Friday evening, for 
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A few years later, however, we find Thys, aged 15 years, having a quite 
different type of conversation with his mother (Bakhti, 2010, DVD 2): 
Filmmaker: So, you’re still like an old couple? 
Mother: But exactly. We are an old couple. It’s totally 
that. So, we’ll have to take the tricks. That’s why 
sometimes it’s a bit hard, isn’t it, Thys? Actually, is it hard 
for you or not? I say that it’s hard for me, but what about 
you? 
Thys: When you yell for nothing, yes. 
Mother: I yell for nothing, you think I yell for nothing? I 
yell straight away . . . but well . . . not that much. 
Thys: As soon as she realizes that she is wrong, as 
soon as she believes that she is right, although it’s not 
true, she starts raising her voice and oh, careful. 
Mother: You too you throw words at me. 
Thys: Ah yes, but . . . 
Mother: You don’t realize you’re getting angry. You tap . . 
Thys: Neither do you . . . 
Mother: You tap your feet, and all. You get up, you get 
upset. Yes, no, still a bit. But it’s true that it is not violent. 
We are not violent, anyway, are we? We are not breaking 
things yet. Or well . . . yes, did we break anything yet? No, 
it’s your brother who used to do that, not us. 
Although it is still his mother who includes him in the conversation and 
pushes him to talk about the recurring past, his answer here is of a quite 
different tone compared to the previous episode. He challenges his 
mother on her depiction on their life together, and he uses memories as 
arguments to defend his position on how she is, as shown in Figure 9.5. 
He does so by generalizing multiple experiences, showing a beginning of 
autobiographical reasoning. It seems that Thys generalizes from past 
experiences using the recurring chronology of past events to extract 
general statements about his mother. 
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Thys: Diego, Kevin, and other people in the class, we 
didn’t really get along, actually. In 7th grade, I even went 
to see the school mediator because they would provoke me 
and . . . I, I hated them. And now, that’s just it, we are 
friends. 
Kevin: Well, we also were smaller, first excuse. . . . We 
were dumber and also Thys, he was an easy prey, actually. 
Thys: As soon as someone would give me a little 
insult, I would take it at the first degree so, that’s it. They 
would tell me “Thys the piss” and it would last me a week 
. . . it would last me a week. 
Kevin: He wouldn’t say much, actually. Or he would 
say, but he would make people laugh more than feel 
scared, so. . . . We were a bit mean then, weren’t we, 
Diego? 
Thys: Yeah. 
[. . .] 
Diego: We would make fun of him but it was not to 
hurt him either. It was a bit to mock him, truth be told. 
And it’s true that in these moments we would have the 
impression that he was hurting. And now that we are here 
and we laugh with him, well it’s less hurtful for him, well, 
it’s not to hurt him actually. 
Thys: I changed a bit and then I came with them and 
I managed to talk and talk. Well yeah, it was super cool, 
actually. 
Here, Thys, with the help of his new friends, creates a new account of the 
past, as shown in Figure 9.6. What he used to interpret as being bullied 
in the first year of the documentary (Bakhti, 2010, DVD 1) becomes the 
product of his overreaction and their global immaturity (Kevin’s “first 
excuse”). He discovers new perspectives on the past, which leads to its 
reinterpretation, although previous resources are still present 
(generalization). His interlocutors, however, also refer to what we may 
call “lay theories of development” or common-sense concepts about the 
maturation of the person. This allows Kevin to explain his previous 
behaviors as a product of a lack of maturity and as something quite 
acceptable for a young teenager. What is notable here is that the story 
Thys, Kevin, and Diego are telling is a co-construction in which the past 
is reinterpreted—one was overreacting and the others were “dumb,” in 
their words—to link it to current social interactions: They can now be 
friends because they have changed and matured. By remembering with 
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Conclusion 
As we move through life, we live new experiences and engage in new 
relationships, all of which can question who we are or, at least, invite us 
to reflect on our past or to share some memories. But how does 
autobiographical memory evolve though the life course? 
In this chapter, we proposed to understand the development of 
autobiographical memory as the process through which one learns to 
“rework” and reinterpret the past in a way that is relevant to the current 
situation of the self. We considered this movement as being one of 
distancing the self from the exactitude and details of past experiences, to 
organize them into stories that can be told to others, and to generalize 
them into concepts about oneself or turn them into lessons to be learned. 
Our attempt here consisted in drawing on the developmental literature 
and expanding it beyond childhood. We have for this privileged a 
pragmatic stance and have proposed an integrative model of 
remembering, which highlights the social, cultural, and imaginary nature 
of remembering. Our proposition is that remembering, like any other 
complex social and cultural psychological dynamic, is a socially situated 
activity that demands the mastery of specific cultural tools and uses 
diverse resources. 
Because remembering draws on previous recalls through time, it is 
subjected to more general developmental processes. In effect, as with any 
other modality of experience, memory is mediated by language and social 
norms, and in spheres of experience that are frequently shared, 
nourished, and elaborated, memories can become increasingly more 
differentiated. In addition, some experiences can be moved from one 
sphere of experience to another (e.g., when one’s musical success can 
support one’s academic expenses; Zittoun, 2012). Finally, some other 
memories can diffuse across spheres of experience and be generalized 
into general principles or personal life philosophies or allow more 
abstract contemplation (Baldwin, 1915/2009; Vygotsky, 1931/1994; 
Werner & Kaplan, 1963; Zittoun et al., 2013). 
Hence, teenagers who start to narrate their childhood to their close 
friends actually start to create the vocabulary and the grammar of the 
autobiographical memories in a given sphere of experience, which can 
then become the values that may govern their future choices in other 
spheres. Conversely, the fact that older people’s stories lose details but 
convey more meaning can be understood as a result of such forms of 
generalization rather than a form of memory loss (Fitzgerald & 
Broadbridge, 2012). 
However, the developmental literature tends to focus on the early 
development of the capacity to remember; then, as life passes and one 
has defined who he or she is, autobiographical memory appears generally 
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as nonproblematic. Of course, the question of autobiographical memory 
and its fate appears in different studies—for example, clinical research 
examining the way in which people narrate themselves and, at times, 
develop more functional autobiographical accounts (Gonçalves & Ribeiro, 
2012a, 2012b); studies on aging, which emphasize progressive 
transformation or losses of memory due to organic transformation 
(Balota, Dolan, & Duchek, 2000); or more general considerations of our 
sense of time and memory (Draaisma, 2004). 
If every occurrence of autobiographical reasoning is one element in a long 
chain of remembering, then it can evolve with experience, become more 
abstract and generalized, and be part of the many processes that 
constitute who we are. Thus, it both allows and constrains our capacity 
to reinvent ourselves. In this sense, autobiographical memory is 
suspended between past and future because it is a variation of a loop of 
imagination. Just as does imagination, it distances itself from experience 
to produce new and unique compositions. Remembering one’s life is, in 
that sense, an imagination of the past that uses a diversity of resources 
and that will have a variety of outcomes (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2015a). 
Indeed, if memory is a way to mentally travel through time (Tulving, 
2002) and to defy the laws of irreversibility of time, then memory is an 
imagination oriented toward the past. 
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